

# TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION



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**Safety of machinery – Security aspects related to functional safety of safety-related control systems**

INTERNATIONAL  
ELECTROTECHNICAL  
COMMISSION

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## INTERNATIONAL ELECTROTECHNICAL COMMISSION

**SAFETY OF MACHINERY – SECURITY ASPECTS RELATED TO  
FUNCTIONAL SAFETY OF SAFETY-RELATED CONTROL SYSTEMS**

## FOREWORD

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IEC TS 63074 has been prepared by IEC technical committee 44: Safety of machinery – Electrotechnical aspects. It is a Technical Specification.

This first edition cancels and replaces the first edition of IEC TR 63074 published in 2019. This edition constitutes a technical revision.

This edition includes the following significant technical changes with respect to IEC TR 63074:2019:

- a) new Clause 6 on Cybersecurity and functional safety of machinery;
- b) new Figure A.1;
- c) new Clause C.3 Example 2 – Use phase of the machine.

The text of this Technical Specification is based on the following documents:

Draft	Report on voting
44/964/DTS	44/987/RVDTS

Full information on the voting for its approval can be found in the report on voting indicated in the above table.

The language used for the development of this Technical Specification is English.

This document was drafted in accordance with ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2, and developed in accordance with ISO/IEC Directives, Part 1 and ISO/IEC Directives, IEC Supplement, available at [www.iec.ch/members\\_experts/refdocs](http://www.iec.ch/members_experts/refdocs). The main document types developed by IEC are described in greater detail at [www.iec.ch/standardsdev/publications](http://www.iec.ch/standardsdev/publications).

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- reconfirmed,
- withdrawn,
- replaced by a revised edition, or
- amended.

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## INTRODUCTION

Industrial automation systems can be exposed to security threats exploiting vulnerabilities due to the fact that:

- access to the control system is possible, for example re-programming of machine functions (including safety);
- "convergence" between standard IT and industrial systems is increasing;
- operating systems have become present in embedded systems, for example IP-based protocols are replacing proprietary network protocols and data is exchanged directly from the SCADA network into the office world;
- software is developed by reusing existing third-party software components;
- remote access from suppliers has become the standard way of operations / maintenance, with an increased cyber security risk regarding for example unauthorized access, availability and integrity.

In the context of the machine, the machine control system represents an industrial automation system.

The safety-related control system of machines is part of the machine control system and can therefore also be subject to security threats that can result in a loss of the ability to maintain safe operation of a machine.

NOTE 1 The risk potential of attack opportunities is significant due to the trends and developments of threats and the amount of known vulnerabilities. Security objectives are mainly described in terms of confidentiality, integrity and availability, which in general will be identified and prioritized by using a risk-based approach.

Functional safety objectives consider the risk by estimating the severity of harm and the probability of occurrence of that harm. The effects of any risk (hazardous event) determine the requirements for safety integrity (safety integrity level (SIL) in accordance with IEC 62061 for safety-related control systems or the IEC 61508 series for electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-related systems, or the Performance Level (PL) in accordance with ISO 13849-1 for safety-related parts of control systems).

With respect to the safety function, the security threats (internal or external) can influence the safety integrity and the overall system availability.

NOTE 2 In order to ensure the security objectives, IEC 62443-3-3 defines and recommends security requirements ("foundational requirements") to be fulfilled by the relevant system.

NOTE 3 The overall security strategy is not covered in this document; further information is provided for example in the IEC 62443 series or ISO/IEC 27001.

Measures to prevent reasonably foreseeable misuse by physical manipulation are addressed in some machinery functional safety standards (e.g. the IEC 61496 series and ISO 14119).

NOTE 4 Measures to prevent reasonably foreseeable misuse by physical manipulation are not the same as physical security in the IEC 62443 series.

# **SAFETY OF MACHINERY – SECURITY ASPECTS RELATED TO FUNCTIONAL SAFETY OF SAFETY-RELATED CONTROL SYSTEMS**

## **1 Scope**

This technical specification identifies the relevant aspects of the IEC 62443 series related to security threats and vulnerabilities that are considered for the design and implementation of safety-related control systems (SCS) which can lead to the loss of the ability to maintain safe operation of a machine.

Typical security aspects related to the machine with potential relation to SCS are:

- vulnerabilities of the SCS either directly or indirectly through the other parts of the machine which can be exploited by security threats that can result in security attacks (security breach);
- influence on the safety characteristics and ability of the SCS to properly perform its function(s);
- typical use case definition and application of a corresponding threat model.

Non-safety-related aspects of security threats and vulnerabilities are not considered in this document.

NOTE Non-safety-related parts of the machine control system can also be affected by security threats with possible impact on operation of a machine, such as productivity, performance or quality. For these aspects, refer to the IEC 62443 series.

The focus of this document is on intentional malicious actions. However, intentional hardware manipulation (e.g. wiring, exchange of components) or foreseeable misuse by physical manipulation of SCS (e.g. physical bypass) is not considered in this document.

This document does not cover security requirements for information technology (IT) products and for the design of devices used in the SCS (e.g., product specific standards can be available, such as IEC TS 63208).

## **2 Normative references**

The following documents are referred to in the text in such a way that some or all of their content constitutes requirements of this document. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.

IEC 62061:2021, *Safety of machinery – Functional safety of safety-related control systems*